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V. CONCLUSION
For more than a generation now, American campaign finance law has
been buffeted between the rivalrous concerns of the law governing the
political process. On the one hand are the myriad everyday rules that control
the act of voting: the details from the siting and hours of operation of polling
places, to the voter registration lists, and the recruitment and training of poll
workers. Except in dramatically undecided elections, such as the 2000
presidential election in Florida, or when the rules are deliberately
manipulated to keep vulnerable groups from being able to participate, this is
an area relegated to administrative oversight and its judicial accompaniment,
rational relations review. This area of "election law" has all the allure of
city council debates on garbage pick-up routes, with few of the immediately
observable benefits.
On the other side of the ledger is the domain of political speech, the core
concern of the First Amendment. Indeed, nowhere is speech more central to
the democratic enterprise as when directed to the issue of who shall govern.
The invocation of speech on central matters of public concern implicates a
distinct set of constitutional issues, with the accompanying doctrinal
attachment to the strict scrutiny standard of review. As soon as speech is
implicated, warning bells go off should the state attempt to regulate on the
basis of content or viewpoint, or should the regulation not satisfy the most
exacting standard of a compelling governmental interest.
* Reiss Professor of Constitutional Law, New York University School of Law. I rely heavily
on the helpful comments of Keith Ewing, Colin Feasby, Richard Pildes, and Geoffrey Stone.
Andrew Furlow and Laura Miller provided research assistance for this essay.
The financing of political campaigns is at once a preliminary act that is
neither the vote nor electoral speech itself, yet it is ultimately directed to the
propagation of a political message to the electorate. As such, it can be
conceptualized as an administrative matter or as the very heart of the
freedom of expression that undergirds democracy. Each of these approaches
finds support from contending wings of a deeply fractured Supreme Court.
One wing of the Court, most prominently led by Justice Stevens, rejects the
conception that money is speech,' while another, most forcefully led by
Justice Thomas, views virtually all restrictions as an affront to the heart of
First Amendment values.2
At the doctrinal level, the Court has temporized by truncating efforts at
reform. In the intricate constitutional balance following Buckley v. Valeo,3
the Court has placed campaign contributions on the administrative side of
the ledger. The need to combat corruption, or even the appearance of
corruption, has allowed a wide margin of regulatory discretion, almost at the
benign level of time, place, and manner restrictions under classic First
Amendment doctrine. At the same time, campaign expenditures have been
drawn into the core of the protections of political expression, with the result
that efforts to curb candidates' and parties' spending habits have been struck
down time and again. The contributions/expenditures divide is the deeply
contested legacy of Buckley, a battered divide that has been rejected by a
majority of the Court for at least a decade. Indeed, in the Court's most
recent encounter with campaign finance, the Justices at the historic center of
the Court-Justices Breyer and Kennedy, who together have stitched much
of the ever-finer refinements of the Buckley legacy 4-have moved to the
polar positions and seem prepared to jettison the Court's historic approach to
this deeply contested issue.'
After three decades of Buckley, it is difficult to imagine a world in
which there are either no restrictions on contributions or significant
limitations on expenditures. This may be a failure of imagination because
the Court seems poised once again to make a decisive move against
Buckley.6 If Buckley were to fall, it will be necessary to craft a new
1. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("Money is property; it is not speech.").
2. See, e.g., id. at 412 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[C]ontributions to political campaigns generate
essential political speech. And contribution caps, which place a direct and substantial limit on core
speech, should be met with the utmost skepticism and should receive the strictest scrutiny.").
3. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
4. See, e.g., Colo. Republican Fed. Election Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996);
Shrink, 528 U.S. 377.
5. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008).
6. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
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approach to the funding of political campaigns-one that may push the
frontiers of what has been attempted in the U.S. previously.
Here I want to turn to an aspect of the most recent reform effort, the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) 7 that I have previously
identified as portending a significant change in the common conception of
campaign regulation.8 The provision is the definition of the "election
period" as a period of greater regulatory authority over "electioneering
communications" that are likely aimed at affecting voter choices in
elections. 9 To date, this framing of a distinct First Amendment arena during
the immediate run-up to an election has not formed part of the Court's
sweeping facial review of BCRA.'o Yet the idea that the period of elections
might serve as a distinct arena of regulation has a significant background in
academic commentary in this country," as well as in the practices in other
democracies of treating the election period as a limited forum for
communication by the candidates for office rather than as a general forum
for political advocacy.
As set out in BCRA, the election period triggers a restraint on
communications outside the formal strictures of the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA)-what are termed independent expenditures fueled
by soft money in the campaign finance lexicon.12 BCRA amended FECA to
regulate "electioneering communication,"' 3 a term that replaced the prior
rule of Buckley v. Valeo that had limited regulation only to express advocacy
on behalf of a candidate-understood to be triggered by the magic words of
"vote for," "support," "elect," "defeat," and so forth. 14 In place of Buckley's
definition, BCRA claims to regulate any communication that in any way
refers to a candidate for federal office in the period sixty days before a
general election or thirty days before a primary election if it is "targeted to
7. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
8. Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1458 (2007).
9. See BCRA § 201(a) (codified as 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3) (2006)).
10. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
11. See, e.g., Robert Post, Regulating Election Speech Under the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 1837, 1839 (1999) (proposing "a detailed appraisal of what constitutionally would be gained,
and what lost, by demarcating elections as a separate domain of First Amendment doctrine");
Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX.
L. REV. 1803 (1999).
12. See BCRA § 201(a) (codified as 2 U.S.C. § 434).
13. Id.
14. See 424 U.S. 1,43-44 (1976).
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the relevant electorate," which means it "can be received by 50,000 or more
persons" in the district or state the candidate seeks to represent. 1S
The purpose of this particular reform was to close the loophole for issue
advocacy: ads that could raise all sorts of scurrilous claims about a candidate
for office but end with an anodyne suggestion that the candidate be "called"
or "asked about" the assertions in the ad.16 As Richard Briffault writes of
the pre-BCRA world, "Pragmatically, the current test is an open invitation
for evasion. It is child's play for political advertisers and campaign
professionals to develop ads that effectively advocate or oppose the cause of
a candidate but stop short of the formal express advocacy that the courts
permit to be regulated."
' 17
McConnell v. FEC18 did not really engage the question whether a
distinct constitutional regime could be created for a narrow period defined
by temporal proximity to the election. Instead, the challenge to this section
of BCRA was premised only on a curious claim that, because express
advocacy was subject to regulation under FECA, there must be some form of
constitutional entitlement to issue advocacy. The Court readily dismissed
this argument: "That position misapprehends our prior decisions, for the
express advocacy restriction was an endpoint of statutory interpretation, not
a first principle of constitutional law."19
Perhaps one reason that the election period provision of BCRA did not
arouse more constitutional scrutiny was the odd combination of a significant
conceptual breakthrough in how to think about campaign finance regulation
with a rather trite set of accompanying regulations. Once inside the domain
of the election period under BCRA, the only resulting requirements are
disclosure of campaign funding sources and a prohibition on the use of
contributions from corporations or unions.20 Disclosure is the least intrusive
form of finance regulation and has been tolerated in almost all settings.
Similarly, corporations and unions are thought to be suspect cauldrons of
other people's money and, accordingly, are subject to much greater
regulation than individual citizens. As the Court noted in addressing
whether corporations devoted to advocacy could be restricted from
contributing to political campaigns, "Since 1907, there has been continual
congressional attention to corporate political activity, sometimes resulting in
15. BCRA § 201(a) (codified as 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(C)).
16. For a discussion on the role of issue advocacy prior to BCRA, see SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF,
PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE
POLITICAL PROCESS 519-21 (3d ed. 2007).
17. Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L. REV.
1751, 1759 (1999).
18. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
19. Id. at 190.
20. See BCRA § 203 (codified as 2 U.S.C. § 441b).
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refinement of the law, sometimes in overhaul .... Today, as in 1907, the
law focuses on the 'special characteristics of the corporate structure' that
threaten the integrity of the political process.'
Despite the unprecedented nature of a distinct election period, however,
BCRA's actual regulations bore little practical import. Nonetheless, an
examination of other constitutional democracies, most notably Great Britain,
reveals that the concept of a formal election period is a much richer source
of potential regulation of campaign activity than contemplated by the limited
engagement in BCRA. The reason, however, is that the election period as it
has emerged historically in Britain is part of an organic conception of
elections that is significantly at variance with the core precepts of our First
Amendment tradition and our conception of politics. In this essay, I want to
do two things. First, I want to present in some detail the comprehensive
regulations of the election period that exists or existed in Britain and the
potentially landmark ruling by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) in Bowman v. United Kingdom.22 Second, I want to further
compare core cases from Germany and Canada to flesh out the point that
reforms, to be meaningful, must have a core logic--one that will prove
problematic under the inherited First Amendment traditions in the U.S.
I. THERE WILL ALWAYS BE AN ENGLAND
The first thing to note about BCRA's "election period" is that it has an
artificially precise time period-thirty days before a primary and sixty days
before a general election for federal office.23 The reason for the artificial
constraints is that there is no natural period for electoral activity in the U.S.
Federal elections take place on a designated date every two, four, or six
years, depending on the office. It is entirely possible for the presidential
election cycle to consume virtually the full four years between elections.
Correspondingly, it is increasingly the case that political strategists such as
Harold Ickes and, most conspicuously, Karl Rove have come to leverage
election strategy expertise into central policy positions in the White House.
But the open-ended American campaigns are by no means the rule in
democratic nations. In parliamentary systems, the timing of elections is a
matter of circumstance rather than a preordained constitutional requirement.
When a government faces a no-confidence vote, loses its parliamentary
21. FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 153 (2003).
22. 1998-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 175.
23. See BCRA § 201(a) (codified as 2 U.S.C. § 434(0(3)).
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majority, believes that the moment is particularly propitious, or has major
leaders forced from office by scandal or prosecution, elections are called for
a date specified at the time. The election period thus has a natural rhythm to
it, beginning with the calling of elections and ending with the elections
themselves. The resulting period can be quite short. For example, in 2005,
the Blair government in Britain called for new elections on April 5th, with
the elections themselves being held on May 5th, a scant thirty days later.24
The ensuing election period is a tightly regulated affair, something
beyond any serious reform proposals in the U.S. 25  The election period is
deemed not an arena of open political discourse but a confined decision by
the voters among the choices presented by the established political parties.
Certainly, there is a corresponding impulse in American law governing the
political process to treat the general election as the "main event" and,
accordingly, liberally to uphold restrictive ballot access provisions for minor
party candidates.26  But the British variant defies anything deemed
compatible with American First Amendment jurisprudence. 27  To begin
with, there is no tradition in Britain of permitting paid television advertising
for elections, whether by candidates, parties, independent organizations, or
anyone else.2' The distinction between express and issue advocacy is of no
moment; candidates for office are given specific invitations to state-provided
media access and no more. 29  Although candidates for Parliament do not
receive public funds, they are restricted in how much they can spend.30 In
1998, at the time of the Bowman litigation, the amounts varied somewhat by
constituency but averaged about £8,300, 3" about $14,000 at the time-an
24. See, e.g., Alan Cowell, Blair Calls Election for May 5 as His Party Slips in Polls, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2005, at A3.
25. For a thorough discussion of the relation between the European conception of an election
period and American constitutional law, see Saul Zipkin, Political Ads, The Vote, and the
Democratic Process (Sept. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
26. 1 have been quite critical of the Court's failure to account for the risk of lock-ups of the
political process and political debates by allowing too much discretion to state officials in closing off
ballot access. See Samuel Issacharoff& Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of
the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998). For overviews of the case law upholding
restrictive access to the general election ballot, see Dmitri Evseev, A Second Look at Third Parties:
Correcting the Supreme Court's Understanding of Elections, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 1287-1302
(2005); James A. Gardner, Deliberation or Tabulation? The Self-Undermining Constitutional
Architecture of Election Campaigns, 54 BUFF. L. REv. 1413 (2007); David Schleicher, "Politics as
Markets" Reconsidered: Natural Monopolies, Competitive Democratic Philosophy and Primary
Ballot Access in American Elections, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 163 (2006).
27. See Jacob Rowbottom, Access to the Airwaves and Equality: The Case Against Political
Advertising on the Broadcast Media, in PARTY FUNDING AND CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 77, 77-96 (K.D. Ewing & Samuel Issacharoff, eds., 2006).
28. Id. at 77.
29. Id. at 77-78.
30. See Bowman v. United Kingdom, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 175, 183-84.
31. Id.
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amount orders of magnitude different from the U.S., where winning
candidates for Congress in 2006 spent an average of $1.3 million.32 The
tight limitations on individual candidates' spending contrasts with the
broader spending ability of the national parties, which means that electoral
debate was financially permitted at the level of party platforms but not at the
level of individual candidates.33
Parliamentary candidates with such limited war chests would be highly
vulnerable to interest group attack and would lack the resources to fight
back. Accordingly, there has to be some measure of protecting the electoral
combatants from outside challenges if such low spending limits are to be
enforced-and there is. To begin, any express advocacy is barred to anyone
other than the candidate.34 In addition, as of 1998, during the election
period, no British citizen could spend more than £5 (that's right, £5, or less
than $10!) to express any views on the British elections.35 As a result, for all
practical purposes, political debate during the election period was restricted
to the political parties whose candidates were running for office and only to
those issues that they wished to address. Even under today's technology-
assisted means of communication, £5 is not enough money to register a
domain name, let alone pay for the bandwidth required to run an advocacy
website.
II. THE SPECTER OF BUCKLEY V. VALEO
No case describes the meaning of the British election period better than
Bowman. At the time of her prosecution for violation of Britain's election
laws, Phyllis Bowman was the executive director of the Society for the
Protection of the Unborn Child (SPUC), an anti-abortion organization, as the
name implies.36 The organization sought to agitate against Britain's liberal
abortion laws by raising the political profile of the issue.37 As hard as it is
for American observers to believe, abortion plays no role whatsoever in
British parliamentary elections. As summarized by the ECHR,
32. Common Cause, Clean Elections for the United States Congress: Taking Big Money Out of
Politics with the Fair Elections Now Act, http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNKI MQI
wG&b=4104607 (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).
33. See Navraj Singh Ghaleigh, Expenditure, Donations and Public Funding Under the United
Kingdom's Political Parties, Elections Referendum Act of2000-And Beyond?, in PARTY FUNDING
AND CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 27, at 35, 37.
34. Bowman, 1998-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 185-86.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 180.
37. Id.
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The major political parties have no policies with regard to abortion
and embryo experimentation: these are regarded as moral issues and
members of Parliament are allowed to vote on proposed legislation
according to their consciences. Mrs. Bowman and SPUC therefore
took the view that, if electors were to be in a position to bring about
changes to the law through their choice of representative, it was
important for them to be informed of the opinions of candidates
standing for election with regard to abortion and related issues.3 8
In an attempt to compel political accountability on the issue of abortion,
SPUC made arrangements to distribute over a million leaflets across the UK
alerting voters as to the positions of the various candidates: "We are not
telling you how to vote, but it is essential for you to check on Candidates'
voting intentions on abortion and on the use of the human embryo as a
guinea-pig."3 9  The leaflet then went on to chronicle the positions taken
historically by the various candidates for office, together with a graphic
depiction of the stages of development of an embryo during the twenty-two
weeks that marked the British period before limitations on abortions took
hold.40 Because the cost of distribution of the leaflets exceeded the statutory
maximum of £5, Bowman found herself subject to prosecution-
incidentally, not for the first time.4'
Despite some procedural uncertainty that precluded successful
prosecution of Bowman on this particular occasion, the ECHR ultimately
struck down the British electioneering restrictions for their potentially
chilling effect on political speech.42  The ECHR was not impressed by
Bowman's alternatives of running for office herself or starting a newspaper,
which would be immune from any limitation on speech.43 Instead, the
ECHR found a sweeping right to free political expression under Article 10
of the European Convention on Human Rights and under the guarantee of
free elections under Article 3 of the First Protocol to the Convention:
38. Id.
39. Id. at 181.
40. Id. at 181-82.
41. Id. at 182.
42. Id. at 189-90.
43. Id. at 189. The paradox of the media being unrestricted in disseminating their election views
is also the subject of debate in the U.S. See Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the
Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1630 (1999) (arguing that a media exception to
campaign finance laws is "unjustifiable"); Danny J. Boggs, Introduction: Campaign Finance and
Media Influence, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5, 6 (2000) (arguing that the importance of the media
in campaigns is underappreciated). For a strong rejoinder, see L.A. Powe, Jr., Boiling Blood, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1667 (1999).
380
[Vol. 36: 373, 2009] Logic of Campaign Finance Regulation
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Free elections and freedom of expression, particularly freedom of
political debate, together form the bedrock of any democratic
system. The two rights are interrelated and operate to reinforce
each other: for example, as the Court has observed in the past,
freedom of expression is one of the "conditions" necessary to
"ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the
choice of the legislature." For this reason, it is particularly
important in the period preceding an election that opinions and
information of all kinds are permitted to circulate freely. 4
The ECHR's expansive view of a liberty interest in free expression sent
shock waves into the British system of election regulation. Once private
parties are freed from expenditure restrictions, individual candidates could
be targeted for challenge based upon individual performance or individual
views. They could no longer assume the protective mantel of the national
party as the focus of politics, even at the level of the individual constituency.
The response of threatened politicians, or their partisans, would necessarily
be to attempt to answer charges against them through their own
expenditures, which seemingly would also be uncapped by the logic of the
ECHR's ruling in Bowman. Once freed from expenditure restraints, the sole
form of regulation left would be limitations on contributions-a particularly
disruptive move in Britain, where the parties are directly funded by their
major backers, as is the Labour Party by the trade unions.45 In short,
Buckley all over again. Or as Baroness Hale of the House of Lords would
comment in one of the British post-Bowman cases, Buckley and its progeny
in American campaign finance law became the "elephant in the committee
room" for subsequent debates in Britain.46
But this was not the only blow to the election period limitations in
Britain. Bowman was followed by another ECHR case from Switzerland,
44. Bowman, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 188 (citations omitted).
45. The Labour Party historically has received more than 60% of its funding from the Trade
Union Congress. See K.D. EWING, THE COST OF DEMOCRACY: PARTY FUNDING IN MODERN
BRITISH POLITICS 5 (2007); Ghaleigh, supra note 33, at 52 (describing party shortfalls should there
be contribution limits). The first measures of contribution regulation in Britain came with the
disclosure requirements of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. For a
discussion of party funding and the effect of the potential restrictions, see K.D. Ewing, The
Disclosure of Political Donations in Britain, in PARTY FUNDING AND CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 27, at 57
46. Regina (Animal Defenders Int'l) v. Sec'y of State for Culture, Media and Sport [2008]
UKHL 15, [2008] 1 A.C. 1312, 1353 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland,47 which raised the possibility
that any ban on political advertising on the broadcast media may also violate
Article 10 of the European Charter on Human Rights.4 8 The combination of
open expression during the election period and potential access to political
advertising currently places the core organizing principles of the British
election period at peril.
The point is, of course, not to exalt the centrality of the debates over
abortion in political life in this country or to hope that this particular issue
takes on more force elsewhere. The prominence of the abortion issue in
American politics is, at the very least, certainly no unalloyed good. From
my personal vantage point, the ability of the polar positions on the abortion
debate to dominate politics and judicial appointments is an unfortunate
feature of contemporary American life, one that the Supreme Court may
have unwittingly sparked by its rush to overly regimentalize
constitutionalization of the abortion debate-a position that I am far from
the first to articulate.49 It is a far reach, however, to go from a desire to
dampen the role of abortion politics all the way to a governance rule for
elections that would allow the incumbent political parties effectively to
silence debate on the issue altogether, particularly in light of its manifest
salience in American political life.
To force such issues to the sideline is more than simply disregarding the
desire of members of the polity to engage issues that may be politically
treacherous for entrenched political parties. Shutting down debate during
the election period forecloses the ability of activists and non-elected political
actors to engage their fellow citizens when political attention is galvanized
around elections. As Saul Zipkin well explains:
The pre-election period is a time of heightened engagement with the
democratic process: a time when both voters and political actors are
more attentive to one another. Political scientists have found that
voters pay closer attention as the election draws near and posit a
"recency bias" (or the "what have you done for me lately"
phenomenon), where voters weigh more heavily their
representatives' recent actions, in response to which politicians
47. 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 243.
48. For a discussion on the potentially sweeping impact of VgT, see Rowbottom, supra note 27,
at 80-81.
49. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 381 (1985) (arguing that the "sweep and detail" of the Court's
rigid definition of constitutional rules in Roe v. Wade and companion cases "stimulated the
mobilization of a right-to-life movement and an attendant reaction in Congress and state
legislatures"),
382
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seeking re-election attempt to accomplish more for their
constituents toward the end of their terms.5 0
A core divide may be found in the underlying theoretical view of the
election process. On the one hand, the elections constitute the highest point
of citizen involvement. For those, like myself, who worry about the
preservation of the competitive environment, the role of competition is not
simply to force retrospective accountability of officeholders, a mechanism
that reduces the agency drift between the preferences of voters and the
policy choices of elected officials. The purpose of electoral competition is
also to force candidates for office to educate the public, help shape
preferences, and provide information so that there is an improvement in the
quality of citizen engagement with self-governance. The repeated analogy is
to the way firms in which sellers in competitive markets help inform the
consumer in the course of trying to demonstrate the superiority of their
product.
On the other hand, it is perfectly possible to see elections themselves as
merely an act of tabulation, as James Gardner terms it. 51 If so, then elections
are purely an administrative event, governed by conventional rules of proper
administrative processes and carrying no more constitutional baggage than
the handling of garbage collection or recycling. The purpose of competition
then becomes a periodic check on the alignment between voter preferences
and the continued office-holding of prior electoral victors. Under this view,
competition is more static and serves to force preference choices back to
those of the median voter-a narrower view of the scope and benefits of
competition, as David Schleicher argues.52
Perhaps, as with all polar categories, the truth may lie somewhere closer
to the midpoint between the rival conceptions of elections. My purpose here
is not to try to resolve this tension but to identify it. The American First
Amendment tradition has treated electoral speech as the vehicle for
expression and citizen engagement. The post-Buckley debates on
contributions versus expenditures turn on which (if any) should be
categorized as speech. If so characterized, then the First Amendment applies
with full force.
The British tradition is another matter. With its abrupt declaration of the
election period, the prohibitions on speech by non-candidates, and the very
50. Zipkin, supra note 25, at 46.
51. See Gardner, supra note 26.
52. See Schleicher, supra note 26.
limitation of time in which the public is even considering elections, the
British electoral process harkens much to the tabulative side of elections as
an administrative tallying of preferences as they exist. For the nascent
election period approach of BCRA to have real traction, both in practice and
constitutionally, there would have to be a fundamental redirection of
American law. That transformation need not be at the level of core First
Amendment principles so much as in the underlying conception of the
purpose of elections.
III. HOLDING THE LINE ON SPENDING
British developments of the past decade confirm the fundamental
incompatibility between a party financing regime premised on spending
limits and one based on liberty concerns over individual rights of self-
expression. Thus far, all of the British authorities to address the issue-an
advisory committee, Parliament, and several judicial opinions-have sought
to limit Bowman to the fact of strikingly low expenditure limits while
circling the wagons over the broader question of overall spending limits.
The initial reaction in Britain was to read Bowman narrowly to its facts.
The Committee on Standards in Public Life, a standing advisory committee
chaired by Lord Patrick Neill, was asked to evaluate the "implications of the
Bowman judgment." 53 The Committee concluded that the simplest way to
accommodate Bowman would be to "raise the limit on expenditure above
£5." 54 Raising the amount to something "of the order of £500... would
provide an allowance sufficient to cover.., the production and distribution
of a leaflet throughout a constituency or the publication of an advertisement
in a local newspaper," but would not be so large as to "force [a] candidate to
devote part of his or her limited resources to rebutting the attacks made by
the third parties."55
Textual differences between European law and the more categorical
commands of the First Amendment allowed the Committee the interpretive
latitude to defend its limited reading of Bowman.16 The crucial difference,
according to the Committee, was that Article 10(1) of the European
Convention on Human Rights, guaranteeing "the right to freedom of
expression," is expressly subject in Article 10(2) to such restrictions "as are
53. COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE, FIFTH REPORT, STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE:
THE FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1998, Cm. 4057-I, at 16.
54. Id. at 129.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 130 ("The language of Article 10 of the Convention is quite different from the free
speech right laid down in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution .... [T]he First
Amendment has been given an absolutist interpretation. In the context of attempted limitations on
election expenditures such restrictions have been repeatedly set aside by the United States Supreme
Court.").
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prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society."57 This proviso
to the Convention's guarantee of free expression left Britain some room, the
Committee believed, to regulate campaign spending as long as the limit was
not as low as in Bowman and as long as the limit could be justified as
"necessary in a democratic society." The Committee found this democratic
necessity in Article 3 of the First Protocol to the Convention, which obliged
each state to "hold free elections ... under conditions which will ensure the
free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the
legislature."58  This "free election principle" fit neatly with the British
government's argument that "it needs to protect voters (and thus to protect
them in respect of their voting rights) from being subjected to overwhelming
election propaganda by a party which has greatly superior financial
resources."
59
The Committee accordingly read Bowman narrowly only to strike down
the particular way in which spending limits were set, a view that resonated
with academic commentary that also saw Bowman as what in the U.S. would
be termed an "as applied" challenge to the particular balances drawn in
"imposing expenditure ceilings to promote electoral fairness." 60 The entire
system could be salvaged were the decimal point moved two places to the
right, an effort that was quickly implemented as Parliament passed the 2000
Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act (PPERA), replacing the
1983 Act's £5 limit with a £500 limit for third party expenditures per-
registered-voter limit for local government elections.61 It also "largely
implement[ed] the Neill Committee's recommendations" with regard to
national spending limits on political parties and third parties.62
The effectiveness of the PPERA remains a matter of debate for reasons
both practical and jurisprudential. First, as with any altered rules, there is
the question of how interested actors will respond-specifically, whether
raising the third party spending limit to £500 would enable "like-minded
persons to 'pool' resources against particular candidates and thereby skew
57. See id. at 127 (citing European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]).
58. Id. at 128 (citing European Convention, supra note 57, Protocol I, art. 3).
59. See id.
60. Navraj Singh Ghaleigh, Case and Comment, Election Spending and Freedom of Expression,
57 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 431, 432-33 (1998); see also Colin Feasby, Issue Advocacy and Third Parties in
the United Kingdom and Canada, 48 MCGILL L.J. 11, 13 (2003).
61. Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000, c. 41, § 131.
62. Keith D. Ewing, Promoting Political Equality: Spending Limits in British Electoral Law, 2
ELECTION L.J. 499, 507 (2003); see also id. at 507-14 (laying out the limit's definition, means of
calculation, and means of enforcement).
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the balance of debate," with the effect of "undermining expenditure
ceilings. 63 More pessimistically, Professor Keith Ewing worries that the
PPERA failed to engage the real thrust of Bowman, such that it was
"unlikely that these reforms will be the last word on third party
limits .... [I]t is surely only a matter of time.., before Convention rights
prove to be the midwife for the further liberalization of laws designed to
promote electoral equality. 64
Thus far, the issue has been joined only at the level of British courts
and not the ECHR, and the result has been a narrow construction of
Bowman, along the lines suggested by the Neill Committee.65 Of greatest
significance is the 2008 decision by the House of Lords in Regina (Animal
Defenders International) v. Secretary of State for Culture, Media and
Sport,66 a challenge to the total ban in Britain on political advertising on
television and radio. 67  In a setting much like Bowman, a single-issue
advocacy group sought to force attention to an issue not generally presented
as part of British elections.68 The question in ADI was whether an
advertising campaign on "My Mate's A Primate" could be banned from the
airwaves. 69 There was simply no escaping that the British law governing
broadcast expression was even more categorical than the expenditure
limitation at issue in Bowman:
No advertisement shall be permitted which is inserted by or on
behalf of any body the objects whereof are wholly or mainly of a
religious or political nature, and no advertisement shall be permitted
which is directed towards any religious or political end or has any
relation to any industrial dispute.7°
For the House of Lords, the question was whether the effect of Bowman
and VgT would force a recasting of the British law on independent political
expression. The short answer was decidedly no. Using the same analytic
63. Ghaleigh, supra note 60, at 433. Oddly, one immediate effect is that third parties are at risk
because they are forbidden to exceed the spending limits for 365 days prior to election day. See
PPERA, c. 41, sched. 10, § 3(3). Because election dates are not fixed, third parties have no effective
way of knowing when their expenditures might run afoul of the regulations. Colin Feasby identified
this curious feature of British law for me.
64. Ewing, supra note 62, at 506-07.
65. See id. at 506.
66. [2008] UKHL 15, [2008] 1 A.C. 1312 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
67. Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 321(2) (prohibiting, inter alia, any advertisement
"which is inserted by or on behalf of a body whose objects are wholly or mainly of a political
nature... [or] is directed towards a political end").
68. See ADI, [2008] 1 A.C. at 1336.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 1337.
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framework as the Neill Committee, the House of Lords held that even the
absolute ban was compatible under the framework set out in Article 10 and
Bowman because the restriction was one that was "necessary in a democratic
society," as permitted by Article 10(2).7
In laying out its reasoning, the House of Lords emphasized the
traditional arguments underlying the stringent British regulations of
campaign spending. Lord Bingham conceded that the Convention regime
protected "free speech in general and free political speech in particular" but
argued that it was "highly desirable that the playing field of debate should be
so far as practicable level," which "is not achieved if political parties can, in
proportion to their resources, buy unlimited opportunities to advertise in the
most effective media, so that elections become little more than an auction. 72
He distinguished the ECHR's decision in VgT, where "the full strength of
this argument [for political equality] was [not] deployed."73  He also
distinguished Bowman, where the ban on advertising "was held to
operate... as a total barrier to Mrs. Bowman's communication of her
views," from ADI, where the interest group was prohibited only from
advertising on television and radio, a ban no "wider than is necessary to
promote the legitimate object which it exists to serve."7 4
Writing separately, Lord Scott reiterated the importance to British
political life of "ensur[ing] a level playing field for the promotion or defence
of political ideas.",75 This point was made even more forcefully by Baroness
Hale, who characterized the case as a fundamental test of "striking the right
balance between the two most important components of democracy: freedom
of expression and voter equality.",76 Lord Scott acknowledged the apparent
tension between VgT and the House of Lords ruling but fell back on the
claim that, in any case, the ECHR's decision in VgT was "not binding on
domestic courts."' 7 7 Time will tell.
71. Id. at 1349.
72. Id. at 1346.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1347.
75. Id. at 1350. Lord Scott made clear, however, his concern that the ban on political broadcasts
might be incompatible with Article 10 in other particular cases. Id. at 1350-51.
76. Id. at 1353.
77. Id. at 1351-52.
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IV. ALTERNATWE CONCEPTIONS OF EQUALITY AND COMPETITION
It is of course possible that the introduction in BCRA of an "election
period" is the opening salvo in an attempt to redefine radically the American
law governing the electoral process. But there is also the tendency to pick
and choose from different ways of organizing production without
understanding how they fit into the product as a whole.
There is a story, now perhaps apocryphal, that when American auto
companies began to slip in the 1970s, worried Detroit executives went to
Japan to observe the new-found wonders of Japanese auto manufacturing.
They noticed the high morale of Japanese auto workers and attributed it (as
did Japanese managers) to the morning calisthenics and the singing of the
company song before each shift. Thinking this was the key to Japanese
production (rather than innovative product design, high quality and
manufacturing efficiencies), the impressed executives returned to the U.S.
and tried to enlist the alienated post-Vietnam generation of auto workers in
rousing renditions of the Ford or GM anthems. The results were desultory,
though perhaps no worse than many other decisions that plagued America's
aging auto industry. 78
The point is simply that plucked out of context, reform measures rarely
will have the kind of systemic integrity that will allow them to function
properly. That is precisely why the Bowman decision is so threatening to the
British electoral system. The prohibition on private spending---even the
overly draconian figure of £5, a figure that does not cover the cost of a trip
to and from the further sections of London-is not an aberration but a part of
an integrated system that restricts any efforts to run elections as anything but
a choice between the major parties.
If a distinct election period is to take hold in the American context, it
must work as part of a comprehensive set of restrictions, much as existed in
Britain prior to Bowman. The shock in Britain was in part the reaction to the
unfamiliarity of the ECHR applying the European Convention in a country
in which there had not been a tradition of judicial review capable of striking
down acts of Parliament. But we can see a similar result reached in a more
proximate setting that shares with the U.S. a well-defined set of
constitutional principles allowing plenary judicial review and a set of speech
restrictions much like the First Amendment. I refer, of course, to Canada
and its constitutional tradition following the adoption in 1982 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.7 9
78. For a perceptive early analysis, see EMMA ROTHSCHILD, PARADISE LOST: THE DECLINE OF
THE AUTO-INDUSTRIAL AGE (1973).
79. See Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, sched. B, pt. I (U.K.).
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Because of parliamentary elections, there is a distinct election period in
Canada. Until a reform in 2007, each parliament could last no longer than
five years, and the government was obligated to call elections sometime
during that period, a practice modeled on Westminster. 80  Numerous
restrictions apply during the election period, most notably strict limits on
expenditures-as opposed to the American practice of granting the most
regulatory grace for contributions rather than expenditures. Indeed, the
Canadian practice is almost the mirror image of the American post-Buckley
world. Whereas the U.S. tries to regulate the supply of money through
contributions, it leaves the world of demand unchecked through the erection
of a constitutional block against efforts to restrain expenditures.8 Canada,
by contrast, assumes an objective of equalizing the resources in political
debates, and hence focuses on expenditure limitations. As explained by the
Canadian Supreme Court in the landmark ruling on Libman v. Quebec:
If the principle of fairness in the political sphere is to be preserved,
it cannot be presumed that all persons have the same financial
resources to communicate with the electorate. To ensure a right of
equal participation in democratic government, laws limiting
spending are needed to preserve the equality of democratic rights
and ensure that one person's exercise of the freedom to spend does
not hinder the communication opportunities of others. Owing to the
competitive nature of elections, such spending limits are necessary
to prevent the most affluent from monopolizing election discourse
and consequently depriving their opponents of a reasonable
opportunity to speak and be heard ....
For spending limits to be fully effective, they must apply to all
possible election expenses, including those of independent
individuals and groups.82
80. With the adoption of section 56.1(2) of the Canada Elections Act, Canada has moved closer
to fixed term election. Canada Elections Act, 2000 S.C., ch. 9, § 56.1(2). There must now be an
election on the third Monday in October every four years if the government does not fall or resign in
the interim. Id. Some argue that flexible election dates give the governing party an unfair advantage
in strategically scheduling elections, and there seems to be a general trend in "Westminster
countries" toward increasingly fixed-period elections. See Henry Milner, Fixing Canada's Unfixed
Election Dates: A Political Reason to Reduce the Democratic Deficit, IRPP POLICY MATTERS, No. 6
(2005), available at http://www.irpp.org/fasttrak/index.htm. For example, most Canadian provinces
now have quasi-fixed dates.
81. Justin A. Nelson, The Supply and Demand of Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUtM. L.
REV. 524, 533 (2000).
82. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569, 598-99 (Can.) (citations omitted).
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In order to implement the equalization objectives, Parliament
promulgated the Canada Elections Act of 2000, which set out rather
restrictive spending limits, including on independent actors. Under the Act,
no citizen could spend more than $3,000 in any election district or $150,000
nationally to promote or oppose a candidate for office.8 3  Even more
stringent was a provision that extended the spending limit to any publicity
concerning any issue with which a candidate might be "particularly
associated. 84  This is a far more intrusive restriction on speech than
anything found in U.S. election laws.85
In upholding the constitutionality of the 2000 Act, the Canadian
Supreme Court pushed even further:
The Court's conception of electoral fairness as reflected in the
foregoing principles [from Libman] is consistent with the egalitarian
model of elections adopted by Parliament as an essential component
of our democratic society. This model is premised on the notion
that individuals should have an equal opportunity to participate in
the electoral process. Under this model, wealth is the main obstacle
to equal participation[J Thus, the egalitarian model promotes an
electoral process that requires the wealthy to be prevented from
controlling the electoral process to the detriment of others with less
economic power .... These provisions seek to create a level
playing field for those who wish to engage in the electoral
discourse. This, in turn, enables voters to be better informed; no
one voice is overwhelmed by another. 16
Now that is an election period. Most striking is the contrast to the non-
election period, in which there are no limits on political advertising other
than general disclosure requirements. The combination of an unregulated
pre-election period, the tightly regulated election period, and the rise of fixed
election dates has led to an increase in political advertising outside the
election period, particularly by third parties who are unable to participate
83. Canada Elections Act § 350.
84. § 350(2)(d).
85. For an analysis on the jurisprudence of the Canadian Supreme Court concerning the equality
rationale, see Colin Feasby, The Supreme Court of Canada's Political Theory and the
Constitutionality of the Political Finance Regime, in PARTY FUNDING AND CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 27, at 245.
86. Attorney Gen. of Can. v. Harper, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, 868, 2004 SCC 33 (Can.) (citations
omitted). It is noteworthy that the Canadian Supreme Court cites to Owen Fiss's The Irony of Free
Speech for the proposition that the State, far from being an enemy of free speech in the electoral
arena, can equalize participation by enhancing the voices of some and restricting those of others. Id.
(citing OWEN M. FIss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 4 (1996)). This is precisely the argument that
the Buckley Court rejected as any justification for campaign finance regulation.
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during the formal election period. The result may not fit well within
American First Amendment jurisprudence, but it coheres around a certain
logic of how an electoral system should operate-something notoriously
missing in the cobbled together law of American campaign finance
regulation.
Canada is interesting because with a relatively similar set of basic
constitutional guarantees, the Canadian Supreme Court adopts an equality
model of political campaigns, one quite distinct from the constitutional
touchstone of liberty that is the basis of American constitutional law. The
two approaches by no means exhaust the range of possibilities in the
difficult domain of political party funding.
Previously, Richard Pildes and I have written favorably about the
basic approaches taken by Germany's Federal Constitutional Court,
(Bundesverfassungsgericht).7 The German Court restricts those campaign
funding restrictions that it deems are likely to thwart competition for elective
office. 88 In its first cut at the vexing problem of how to finance political
parties, the German Court in 1958 struck down a statutory provision that
allowed political contributions to be tax deductible: "[T]he possibility of
deducting donations to a political party from taxable income creates an
incentive primarily for corporate taxpayers and those with high incomes to
make donations .... The challenged provisions, therefore, favor those
parties whose programs and activities appeal to wealthy circles . ,.89 The
German Court suggested that, as an alternative, the government could
provide public funding to parties and parliamentary candidates. The court
allowed funding to be tied to electoral support, but not on successfully
running for office. According to the German Court, that would tend to lock
in place permanently the parties already represented in the Bundestag: "It is
inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity for [the Bundestag] to
provide these funds only to parties already represented in parliament or to
those which ... win seats in parliament." 90 The German Court similarly
struck down a requirement that a party needed to obtain at least 2.5% of the
votes in order to qualify for public funding on the grounds that a 0.5%
threshold guaranteed political seriousness and allowed more competitive
challenges to the status quo. 91
87. See Issacharoff& Pildes, supra note 26, at 690-99.
88. Id. at 695-97.
89. DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY 203 (2d. ed. 1997) (translating the Party Finance Case 1, 6 BVerfGE 273 (1957)).
90. See id. at 208 (translating the Party Finance Case 111, 20 BVerfGE 56 (1966)).
91. See id. at 210-11 (commenting on the Party Finance Case IV, 24 BVerfGE 300 (1968)).
Like the Canadian equality model, the German approach has the virtue
of organizing constitutional oversight of the party funding process around a
principled logic, even if some of the applications are difficult and no doubt
contestable. Regardless of the normative appeal of either model, the
coherence is what sets them apart from either BCRA's curious insertion of
an election period into American law or the attempt to impose a liberty of
expression constraint onto British law.
V. CONCLUSION
A decade before BCRA, Frank Sorauf wrote caustically of the world of
campaign finance regulations that the Supreme Court had bequeathed:
We shall never know what kind of regulatory regime the FECA
amendments of 1974 created because they were so drastically
altered by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo. What was
intended to be a closed system in which the major flows of money
into and out of campaigns were fully controlled emerged as an open
system of uncontrolled outlets when the Court struck down all
limits on direct spending in the campaign by candidates, PACs, and
individuals. A tightly constrained regulatory system became a more
relaxed, open-ended one. The modifications in Buckley meant that
the original 1974 plan would never have to meet its two severest
tests: the administration of spending limits in hundreds of races and
the accommodation of excess money in a system with no effective
outlets. Instead, the crippled FECA affected chiefly the recruitment
of money, ending the freedom of the fat cats and encouraging the
development of PACs.
92
It is certainly intriguing that BCRA introduced, for the first time, a
distinct arena of electioneering communications during a temporally-defined
election period. If the logic were to play out, this might be the opening
gambit in a more administrative approach to the fiunding of political
campaigns with a corresponding protection from assaults from without.
Without a deeper set of institutional arrangements of the sort seen in Britain
or Canada, however, BCRA's innovation appears as simply one more act of
grafting on oddly mismatched parts to the chaotic law of American
campaign finance.
Perhaps the concern over an animating constitutional logic is misplaced.
American law, like American life, values the ability to persevere and muddle
through on a pragmatic basis. But with current campaign finance law
92. FRANK J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALITIES 238 (1992).
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looking ever more precarious in the Supreme Court, the healthy impulse to
"leave what's working well enough alone" appears incapable of generating
the ever finer pragmatic distinctions necessary to sustain the law of
campaign finance in the post-Buckley period.
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